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It's Time to Cut Government 
Regulations 
Murray W eidenbaum and Melinda Warren 
The time is ripe for a new cycle of change 
in the intermittent swings from regulation to 
deregulation and back. In the past twenty-five 
years, the United States has been through sev-
eral cycles of regulation and deregulation. Al-
though there is substantial variation among in-
dividual government agencies, regulation has 
imposed substantial costs on the U.S. economy, 
while deregulation has generated significant 
benefits to the American public. A five-point 
program of regulatory reform is needed - and 
is presented in this report. 
The rapid expansion of regulatory programs 
through the mid-1970s was followed by an un-
usual spurt of deregulation. By the mid-1980s, 
however, the push to deregulate had ended. 
With few exceptions, the late 1980s and early 
1990s have been a time of expanding regula-
tion, especially dealing with the environment 
and the workplace. 
Although generalizations are always difficult 
to make, there are right and wrong reasons to 
regulate and good and bad ways of regulating. 
Properly designed regulation can correct seri-
ous shortcomings in the marketplace that lead 
to what economists call external costs. Under 
the present regime of property rights, there is 
limited incentive for an individual or an enter-
prise to protect the interests of others. Where 
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resources are free and open to everyone -
water and air are good examples - those re-
fraining from polluting merely increase their 
own costs without achieving direct benefits of 
offsetting magnitude. This is so, even when 
cleaning the air and water generates more 
benefits than costs to society as a whole. This 
s.ituation has been frequently cited as justifica-
tiOn for government intervention. That does 
not mean, however, that all rules designed to 
deal with environmental concerns are necessar-
ily cost-effective or even sensible. Neverthe-
less, the basic justification for governmental 
intervention in this aspect of economic life is 
clear. 
In contrast, regulations that stifle competi-
tion - industry-specific rules limiting entry or 
price - almost invariably cost the nation more 
than the benefits derived by the groups these 
rules are designed to protect. The industry-
specific rules are usually labeled economic 
regulation while those dealing with pollution 
and other externalities are categorized as social 
regulation. 
The Costs of Government Regulation 
Policymakers do not start out with a clean 
slate. The costs of complying with existing 
government regulations are very high and take 
many forms. These costs include hiring addi-
tional workers to keep abreast of and to re-
spond to government directives; purchasing 
equipment to meet government health, safety, 
and environmental standards; and revising pro-
duction processes in response to other govern-
ment requirements. Regulation also forces en-
terprises to change their manner of operations 
- to comply with workplace directives, rules 
on acceptable product characteristics, and pro-
hibitions against a variety of activities. Be-
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cause uncertainty raises business costs 
(especially in the eyes of potential investors), 
the frequent changes in federal, state, and local 
regulations - and how they are administered 
- represent a serious deterrent to new under-
takings. 
The costs of complying with existing 
government regulations are very high 
and take many forms. 
The costs of government regulation are not 
restricted to businesses, however. Much of the 
rulemaking extends to all employers, be they 
profit or non-profit, in the public sector or in 
the private sector. In addition, taxpayers pay 
for supporting a host of government regulators; 
consumers pay higher prices to cover the added 
expense of producing goods and services under 
government regulation and often forego product 
variety; and workers bear the burden when jobs 
are eliminated as a result of the burdens im-
posed by government regulation. 1 Because of 
the economies of scale in complying with 
regulation, smaller enterprises are dispropor-
tionately affected. Regulation also diverts re-
search and development from product creation 
to "defensive R&D," those efforts that try to 
assure that the product will not be rejected by 
regulators. In the process, society as a whole 
suffers a reduced flow of new and better prod-
ucts and a less rapid rise in the standard of liv-
ing. 
These many adverse impacts are important 
but subtle. They are rarely known to the public 
- unless they have first-hand experience in 
dealing with government officials. A special 
3 
insight was provided by former senator and 
presidential candidate George McGovern. He 
bemoaned the government's regulatory burdens 
after a failed attempt to operate a small busi-
ness: 
I learned by owning the Stratford Inn 
that legislators and government regulators 
must more carefully consider the economic 
and management burdens we have been im-
posing on U.S. business .... I'm for protect-
ing the health and well-being of both workers 
and consumers. I'm for a clean environment 
and economic justice. But I'm convinced we 
can pursue these worthy goals and still cut 
down vastly on the incredible paperwork, the 
complicated tax forms, the number of minute 
regulations, and seemingly endless reporting 
requirements that afflict American business. 
Many businesses, especially small independ-
ents such as the Stratford Inn, simply can't 
pass such costs on to their customers and re-
main competitive or profitable. 2 
McGovern concluded that, if he were back in 
the Senate, "I would ask a lot of questions be-
fore I voted for any more burdens on the thou-
sands of struggling businesses across the na-
tion. "3 
Some of the costs associated with regulatory 
programs are extremely frivolous and clearly 
unnecessary from the viewpoint of achieving 
any serious public policy objective. Here are 
just a few examples of the many absurd re-
quirements imposed on U.S. businesses: 
• A Kansas City bank was ordered by regu-
lators to put a Braille keypad on a drive-
through ATM. 4 
• In Boise, Idaho, a plumbing company was 
penalized by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) because 
"proper" safety precautions were not taken 
4 
by the employees who successfully rescued 
a suffocating construction worker from a 
collapsed trench. The $7,875 OSHA fine 
was eventually rescinded due to public 
5 
outrage. 
• USDA has required California farmers to 
dispose of millions of pounds of otherwise 
good peaches and nectarines simply be-
cause they were smaller than federal stan-
dards permitted. Fruit that could have 
been sold or given away to the needy had 
to be left to rot. 6 
• John Pozsgai, a self-employed truck me-
chanic in Morrisville, Pennsylvania was 
fined $202,000 and sentenced to 3 years in 
jail for hauling away 7,000 old tires and 
rusting car parts and placing clean fill on 
his own, occasionally wet, property with-
out a federal permit. The EPA argued that 
the property was a wetland because a 
stream - dry for most of the year - was 
partly trapped by the discarded junk and 
created several standing pools of water. 7 
The Direct Costs of Regulation 
The historical trend of regulatory activities 
can be measured by changes in the size of the 
total work force of the federal regulatory 
agencies (see Table 1). After rapid growth in 
the decade of the 1970s (a 74 percent rise from 
1970 to 1980), the regulatory wave crested. A 
16 percent decline in the staffing of these ac-
tivities, from 121,791 positions in 1980 to 
102,192 in 1985, reflects the substantial cut-
backs in the early years of President Ronald 
Reagan's administration. During the Bush 
presidency, employment at federal regulatory 
agencies started an upward trend that has con-
tinued into the Clinton administration. In 1993, 
the regulatory headcount was an all-time high 
of 129,760. 8 
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The growth in regulatory staffing is re-
flected in the budgets of the federal regulatory 
apparatus (see Table 2). After reaching $8.8 
billion (in constant 1987 dollars) in the last year 
of the Carter administration, these costs were 
decreased in President Reagan's first term. 
Federal regulatory budgets then rose slowly 
during his second term in office. President 
George Bush stepped up spending on regulation 
and President Bill Clinton has continued this 
trend. Nearly $12 billion (in constant 1987 
dollars) were spent in 1993 to fund U.S. regu-
1 . 9 a tory agencies. 
Another widely used proxy used to measure 
the trend of government regulation is the num-
ber of pages in the Federal Register, the publi-
cation in which regulations are listed. The size 
of this publication shrunk from approximately 
87,000 pages in 1980 to about 53,000 in 1988. 
By 1991 , the number of pages had grown to 
67,700. 10 
Using any or all of these measures, gov-
ernment regulation in the United States is on 
the upswing once again. Of course, the cost of 
regulation only begins with funding and staffing 
federal agencies. In several early efforts to 
quantify the larger impacts, the Center for the 
Study of American Business estimated that the 
cost of complying with federal regulations was 
$63 billion in 1976 and $103 billion in 1979. 11 
Later research reveals that these costs are con-
tinuing to increase rapidly. In 1990, Rochester 
Institute of Technology economist Thomas 
Hopkins estimated the overall annual cost of 
federal regulation at roughly $400 billion, an 
average of $4,000 per household. 12 
Given the absence of a comprehensive data 
base on the subject, such measures are only 
indicative at best. Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the costs of complying 
with regulation have declined since 1990 - or 
even stabilized. A recent report from the Busi-
7 
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consumers buy . . These higher prices represent 
the "hidden tax" of regulation, which is shifted 
from government to the consumer. To the ex-
tent that government-mandated requirements 
impose similar costs on all price categories of a 
given product (such as catalytic converters on 
automobiles), this hidden tax is more regressive 
than other federal taxes such as the income tax. 
That is, federal regulation often places a heav-
ier relative burden on lower income groups 
than on higher income groups. 
Most of the costs of government regulation 
show up in higher prices for the goods and 
services that consumers buy. 
Another indirect cost that needs to be con-
sidered is a reduction in the international conl-
petitiveness of U.S. companies. The Clean Air 
Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(Superfund) impose far more stringent regula-
tions on manufacturing and other firms doing 
business in the United States than these com-
panies would be required to meet in other na-
tions. The average cost of cleaning up a haz-
ardous waste site in the United States is $30 
million, far greater than the average of $1 mil-
lion per site reported by businesses operating in 
the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, the 
average cost ranges from $1 million to almost 
$5 million. 16 
These international differences are not lim-
ited to environmental programs. The pervasive 
tax and regulatory obstacles placed in the way 
of U.S. business - especially high-tech com-
panies - add significantly to the cost of doing 
10 
business in the United States. Increasingly, 
many American firms are being forced to shift 
their investment patterns to foreign locations. 
Some of the best-known American companies 
have deployed a majority of their assets over-
seas - Manpower, Inc. (72%), Gillette ( 66%), 
Mobil (63%), Digital Equipment (61 %), Exxon 
(56%), Chevron (55%), Bankers Trust (52%), 
and Citicorp (51% ). 17 The point being made 
here should not be misunderstood; our criticism 
is limited to those instances where American-
based companies would stay in the United 
States were it not for the disincentives of gov-
ernmental regulation. 
Benefits of Deregulation 18 
An unprecedented reduction of regulation 
occurred in the United States in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. It was supported by an unusual 
coalition of Democratic and Republican legisla-
tors, consumer advocates, and scholars in the 
fields of economics, law, and political science. 
However, these deregulatory efforts applied 
only to economic regulation. Social regulatory 
programs continued to expand. 
Airline Deregulation 
The passage of the Air Cargo Act of 1977 
and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 vir-
tually eliminated economic regulation of the 
domestic airline industry. The primary regula-
tory authority over airline routes and fares, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board, was abolished. It is 
estimated that deregulated fares are 18 percent 
lower than they would have been under regula-
tion. The price of air travel fell (in real, infla-
tion-adjusted terms) by more than 20 percent 
from 1978 to 1991 and accident rates declined 
by 48 percent during the same time period. 
Due to reduced regulation, consumers enjoy an 
11 
annual benefit estimated in excess of $10 bil-
lion.19 
Not all changes in regulatory policy have 
been benign. For the crucial decade 1979-
1989, Congress shifted the responsibility for 
airline antitrust enforcement from the Depart-
Inent of Justice to the Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT). In a misguided effort to help the 
airline industry, DOT rubber-stamped every 
airline merger during the 1980s, usually over 
the vehement objection of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department. The result is an 
unexpected high degree of market concentra-
tion in the airline industry. The share of U.S. 
airline traffic held by the three largest carriers 
rose from 37 percent in 1981 to 56 percent in 
1992. This development undercut the basic ra-
tionale underlying economic deregulation: 
competition does a better job of protecting the 
consumer than regulation. A study of airline 
mergers during 1985-88 reported that these 
consolidations increased air fares by an average 
of 9 percent relative to routes unaffected by 
these mergers. 20 
Another factor adversely affecting the re-
sults of deregulation is the failure of govern-
ment - which owns the airports and manages 
the air navigation system - to keep pace with 
rising demand and to manage its functions sen-
sibly. The result has been congestion in air-
ports and in the sky causing delays and other 
problems for the traveling public. Avoidable 
congestion arises because landing fees for ex-
ecutive, personal, and other small aircraft are 
lower than the costs such planes impose on the 
air transportation system. Eliminating the sub-
sidy of "light" airplanes by raising their fees 
for using the major airports would encourage 
their operators to shift to smaller, less fre-
quently used facilities. Moreover, most aircraft 
accidents involve at least one "light" (e.g., pri-
vate) airplane. However, when Logan Airport 
12 
in Boston tried to raise the fees charged to 
small aircraft, the pressures from the owners 
and operators were so intense that the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation forced an indefinite 
delay, ostensibly so that the matter could be 
"studied." 
Nevertheless, on balance, the public has 
achieved positive results from airline deregula-
tion. The most compelling evidence of the 
benefit of airline deregulation is the fact that 
the portion of the national population that trav-
els by air has increased very substantially. 
Economists John Warner and Richard McKen-
zie estimate that between 1979 and 1986, air-
line deregulation increased air travel by an an-
nual average of 11 percent. 21 
Competition does a better job of protecting 
the consumer than regulation. 
Deregulation of Surface Transportation 
Substantial deregulation of surface transpor-
tation also took place in the 1980s. The Stag-
gers Act of 1980 provided for substantial de-
regulation of the railroads. As a result of the 
changes that companies were allowed to make 
without going through the elaborate regulatory 
process, railroads reduced operating costs as 
well as rates to shippers. Researchers estimate 
that deregulation of the rail industry saves ship-
pers between $3 billion and $5 billion a year. 
Railroad accidents have declined 70 percent 
since the late 1970s. Although operating reve-
nues have fallen, expenses have declined even 
faster, making it more profitable for the rail-
roads to operate . 22 
13 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 eliminated 
the barriers to entry, price discrimination, and 
price fixing that had characterized the trucking 
industry since the 1930s. Between 1980 and 
1992, the number of carriers increased from 
about 18,000 to more than 48,000. The total 
number of jobs in the trucking industry rose by 
about 30 percent. Savings to the economy are 
estimated to be on the order of $8 billion a 
year. Also, the fatal accident rate per 100 mil-
lion vehicle miles shrank 40 percent between 
1978 and 1989.23 Recent decontrol of state 
trucking is likely to produce additional savings. 
Deregulation of the rail industry saves shippers 
between $3 billion and $5 billion a year. 
Until deregulation, interstate trucking was a 
textbook case of how goverrunent power was 
used to protect the "ins." Regulation by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) prior 
to 1980 insulated existing trucking firms and 
their employees from potential competition by 
making it very difficult for new trucking com-
panies to enter the business. The redistribution 
of income brought about by deregulation was to 
consumers in general from the owners, manag-
ers, and employees of the regulated industry . 
Moreover, the reduction of ICC regulation in 
recent years has also resulted in substantial 
transfers of income and wealth from the tradi-
tionally regulated portion of the industry to new 
entrants. 
Financial Institutions Deregulation 
Banking deregulation is a more controver-
sial area. Significant reduction in the regula-
14 
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tion of financial institutions took place in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, but substantial gov-
errunent involvement remains. In the 1970s, 
interest rates on deposits of $100,000 and over 
were deregulated. As securities firms took ad-
vantage of that "loophole," banks responded 
with a new round of innovation. A process 
was set in motion that has resulted in the lifting 
of interest-rate ceilings of all deposits, payment 
of interest on consumer-demand deposits, and 
greater competition among financial institu-
tions. However, a substantial goverrunent role 
- and liability - remained, especially in de-
posit insurance. 
In 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act provided a wide variety of new 
and expanded powers for banks and other de-
pository institutions. The law enables banks to 
establish deposit accounts competitive with 
money-market funds and other mutual funds. 
These new accounts carry no maximum interest 
rate and modest minimum balance require-
ments. The changes had powerful and almost 
instantaneous effects. The great majority of 
personal bank accounts were moved to the 
new, competitive types. A substantial (but far 
from complete) shift occurred from money-
market mutual funds to bank accounts. 
The deregulation of savings and loan asso-
ciations (S&Ls) in the early 1980s is frequently 
cited as a cause of the thrift crisis and the ensu-
ing S&L bailout. In retrospect, the timing of 
the deregulation was most unfortunate. Elimi-
nating interest rate ceilings and permitting 
thrifts to invest in a wider range of assets was 
an appropriate response to the financial risk 
that accompanied wide swings in inflation and 
interest rates; such deregulation enhanced the 
competitive positions of the S&Ls. Unfortu-
nately, however, the goverrunent waited until 
the S&Ls were locked into low-yield long-term 
mortgages and only then permitted them to pay 
15 
market rates of interest for their borrowings 
(usually called deposits). This combination of 
forces - lending long-term at low interest rates 
while borrowing short -term at high rates - was 
a recipe for financial disaster·. 
In 1994, Congress passed a new banking 
law, the Interstate Banking and Branching Ef-
ficiency Act. When it becomes effective, this 
statute will go a long way to eliminate the 
McFadden Act, the basic law restricting inter-
state banking. The new legislation has two 
major parts. The interstate banking section al-
lows bank holding companies, beginning in the 
fall of 1995, to acquire banks in other states. 
This provision overrides state laws that bar out-
of-state institutions. 
The interstate branching provisions of the 
new law are more complicated. Beginning in 
June 1997, banks and holding companies can 
consolidate their multi-state holdings into a 
single branch network. However, states can 
opt out of interstate branching before the new 
rules take effect by passing a law forbidding 
such action. Over a period of years, the result 
of the 1994 statute is likely to be fewer inde-
pendent banks, more branch offices, and 
greater diversification of banking risk. 24 
Despite the reduction in economic regula-
tion, Congress has not relented in increasing 
social regulations imposed on financial institu-
tions. Examples in force include the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, the 
Fair Credit Billing Act, the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act, the Consumer Leasing Act, the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The 
1994 Banking Law contains significant new 
"community reinvestment" provisions, prohibit-
ing out-of-state banks from using interstate 
branches "primarily for deposit production" 
rather than for helping to meet community 
16 
credit needs. This provision runs counter to 
the thrust toward national banking. It also per-
petuates the myth pushed by CRA supporters 
that banks should lend primarily in their locali-
ties. That runs counter to the desires of deposi-
tors who seek the highest risk-adjusted returns. 
It is another example of trying to do good with 
other people's money. 
Other Deregulatory Efforts 
A reduction has occurred in the activities of 
many other economic regulatory agencies. In 
1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
ordered an end to fixed brokerage fees for 
stock market transactions. In 1981, President 
Reagan decontrolled crude-oil prices and petro-
leum allocations. Contrary to much contempo-
rary criticism, the subsequent trend of energy 
prices in the United States has been clearly 
downward. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 
· 1982 permitted bus companies to change routes 
and fares. 
In 1984, the Shipping Act enabled individ-
ual ocean shipping companies to offer lower 
fares and better service than so-called 
"shipping conferences" (really cartels). Also in 
1984, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) eliminated rules that required TV 
stations to keep public records of the shows 
they air and to determine the programming 
needs of the communities in which they oper-
ate. Thus far, the changes have mainly re-
sulted in less paperwork, because most stations 
provide more news and public affairs than the 
FCC requires and fewer than the maximum of 
commercials previously allowed. 
In the telecommunications industry, the 
government-forced breakup of AT&T has led 
to a rationalization of rates. Charges for indi-
vidual services now approximate more closely 
the cost of service. The adjustments required 
to meet competition have reduced subsidies for 
17 
some consumers - particularly customers in 
rural regions - while lowering rates substan-
tially for users of long distance telephone serv-
ice. In reducing the cross-subsidization bred 
by regulation, the balance of benefit is surely 
positive. The burst of competition in this hith-
erto closed industry has set in motion an un-
precedented wave of technological innovation 
which has produced a continuing expansion in 
the variety of telecommunication services avail-
able to the public. 
In one key area - the regulation of foreign 
trade - some backsliding has occurred amidst 
major progress. During the 1980s, the federal 
government renewed or extended restrictions 
on the import of automobiles, meat, motorcy-
cles, sugar, steel, and textiles. With the end of 
the Cold War, however, export controls on na-
tional security grounds have been eased sub-
stantially. 
The congressional passage of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (N AFT A) is 
an example of basically positive legislation with 
a few serious shortcomings. The main thrust of 
N AFT A advances regulatory reform by reduc-
ing trade and investment barriers between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico. The 
agreement, however, also contains stringent 
"national origin" requirements in the case of 
automobile imports. During the 1980s, this 
restriction on open trade had failed to gain con-
gressional approval on its own "merits." How-
ever, the overwhelming congressional approval 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in late 1994 represents a major move 
toward a more open world trading environ-
ment. 
Summary 
It is evident that a considerable portion of 
the traditional economic regulatory apparatus 
has been cut back - at the same time that 
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newer forms of social regulation have been on 
the rise. Reduced economic regulation -
ranging from outright deregulation to simplifi-
cation and streamlining of rule making - has 
enabled the competitive process to work better. 
More people are traveling by air at lower real 
costs. Depositors in financial institutions are 
receiving higher returns on their money, as a 
greater variety of companies compete for their 
business. Long-distance telephone users are 
finding that greater competition has resulted in 
lower rates, while subsidies to local service 
have been reduced. 
A lack of concern with adverse economic 
impacts has accompanied the most rapid 
expansion in environmental and workplace 
regulation in American history. 
The reverse trend has been experienced in 
the area of social regulation. A lack of concern 
with adverse economic impacts has accompa-
nied the most rapid and costly expansion in 
environmental and workplace regulation in 
American history. 
Renewed Regulatory Expansion 
On the basis of public reaction to develop-
ments in government during the 1980s, a dif-
ferent policy climate for business has taken 
shape during the Clinton administration. It is 
an external environment less hospitable than 
that existing during the Reagan or Bush presi-
dencies. This business climate is not a return 
to the 1970s, when business was almost uni-
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formly portrayed as the villain and subjected to 
a host of new government restrictions and 
regulations. But it is a step away from the 
relatively pro-business environment of the 
1980s, to a more hostile or at least more am-
bivalent position. 
Soon after becoming president in early 
1993, Bill Clinton blasted "shocking" drug 
prices. The President's top political strategist, 
in discussing proposed changes in the health 
care system, was quoted as saying, "Those who 
get in your way, you try to run over by saying 
they are putting their self-interest against the 
national interest. "25 This harsh talk was 
quickly followed by tax increases on corpora-
tions generally and new limits on the tax de-
ductibility of the compensation of chief execu-
tive officers. 
Although the push to effectively nationalize 
the health care system was derailed during the 
last Congress, the Clinton administration has 
tightened regulation in many other instances. 
In the civil rights area an enforcement drive has 
been enacted that will affect an array of indus-
tries nationwide. For example, banks are being 
required to open more branches and make more 
investments and subsidized loans in black 
neighborhoods. Investigations of charges of 
lending discrimination have dramatically in-
creased. 
One of the most controversial civil rights is-
sues being pursued by the current administra-
tion is "environmental justice. " EPA has been 
ordered to come up with a plan to protect poor 
minority communities from an unfair share of 
pollution. As is the case in many other regula-
tory areas, the very existence of an 
"environmental justice" problem is a contro-
versial issue. Several recent studies have ques-
tioned the research upon which the entire envi-
ronmental justice movement is based. 26 
Researchers have not adequately analyzed the 
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population composition of an area prior to the 
siting of an industrial plant or hazardous waste 
facility. Often, major population changes have 
occurred after the building was constructed. 
Thus, reduced property values around a new 
waste disposal site often encourage more low-
income - in many cases, minority - families 
to move to the area after the facility becomes 
operational. 
Federal regulators are stepping up 
enforcement with a fervor that has not 
been seen since the 1970s. 
Federal regulators are stepping up enforce-
ment with a fervor that has not been seen since 
the 1970s. The head of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Jo-
seph Dear, is moving forward with one of the 
most ambitious regulatory agendas in the 
agency's history. It includes an indoor-air 
quality proposal that OSHA estimates would 
cost $8 billion a year. 27 
Mary Schapiro, the new head of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
has promised to expand her agency's reach. 
Repeal of the antifraud regulatory exemptions 
for some hybrid commodity products and the 
formulation of a policy on financial derivatives 
are two of the initiatives she plans to adopt 
during her tenure at the CFTC. She is quoted 
as saying that industry can expect "a real dedi-
cation to enforcement, unlike any other chair-
man the agency has had. "28 
The Antitrust Division of the Justice De-
partment is reviving its enforcement of resale-
price maintenance, an area of antitrust law that 
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had seen no new cases since the 1970s. Scru-
tiny of vertical mergers between a manufac-
turer and distributor of the same product has 
been revived. The division is hiring 25 new 
lawyers, after adding 34 attorneys and 60 
paralegals since mid-1992?9 
Reforming Government Regulation 
Over the years, many efforts have been 
made to improve the process of government 
regulation. However, virtually all of the 
changes have focused on executive branch rule-
making. Truly reforming government regula-
tion means far more than just revising the way 
regulatory agencies carry out the tasks assigned 
to them by Congress. In order to reduce the 
very large and often avoidable economic bur-
dens imposed by regulation, policymakers need 
to focus on the birth stage of the rulemaking 
process. The crucial action occurs, for exam-
ple, when Congress enacts an 800-page Clean 
Air Act with unrealistic timetables and an al-
most endless array of requirements. No 
amount of Executive Branch analysis per-
formed afterwards can deal with the problem. 
It is up to Congress itself to weigh carefully 
the benefits and costs before it enacts a regula-
tory statute and also to make sure that, if a new 
law is required, its provisions are as cost-
effective as feasible. Congress should also ex-
amine the cumulative effects of government 
regulation on the performance of the economic 
system. The expansion of regulation in the 
United States has passed the point of diminish-
ing returns. Far too often, those returns are 
negative. 
In the past, economists have written about 
the discouraged worker, who gives up the job 
search in the belief that no suitable job opening 
is available. We now have the phenomenon of 
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the discouraged employer. Most policymakers 
and their advisers, however, ignore an obvious 
symptom of this unfortunate situation: over-
time is now at an all-time peak. Many employ-
ers pay the penalty rate of time-and-a-half for 
overtime rather than hire an additional worker. 
The reason all too often lies in government 
regulation and mandates. 
Congress should carefully weigh benefits and 
costs before it enacts a regulatory statute. 
Small businesses provide the clearest exam-
ples of the discouraged employer. Companies 
with a work force of 49 report that they avoid 
hiring "number 50." If they did so, they would 
become subject to the requirements of the af-
firmative action program and other federal 
regulation. The health reforms proposed by the 
Clinton administration in 1994 also would have 
affected firms with 50 or more workers. 
Comprehensive Approach Is Needed 
With hundreds of regulatory statutes on the 
book, it is not feasible to renew and revise each 
of them. Instead, Congress should write one 
new law which will reform regulation across-
the-board. Five key provisions would be es-
pecially helpful: 
1. A requirement for benefit-cost analysis in 
each key stage of the regulat01y process 
- from writing the statutes to issuing 
regulations and reviewing the operation 
of regulatory programs. Congress and 
the regulatory agencies should avoid an 
"at-any-cost" approach to achieving 
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regulatory goals. A zero-based review 
of existing regulations is long overdue. 
2. When a statute requires cltLzens or or-
ganizations to obtain a permit, a fixed 
timetable should force the agency to act 
in a timely fashion. If the agency is not 
able to process an application by the 
deadline, the permit should be granted 
automatically. The private sector should 
not be punished for the shortcomings of 
the public sector. 
3. Legislation should emphasize objectives 
sought rather than precise methods to be 
used for each regulatory program. De-
tailed laws that place "legislative hand-
cuffs" on agency administrators prevent 
more cost-effective solutions. On the 
other hand, legislators should avoid 
writing laws so vague that they know in 
advance that the courts will have to 
wrestle with the details. Congress 
should also refrain from passing regula-
tory laws with requirements that they 
know are not reasonably attainable. The 
notion of wntmg laws that are 
"technology-forcing" is wasteful of eco-
nomic resources. 
4. The federal government should use risk 
assessment to help set priorities for 
achieving greater protection of health, 
safety and the environment in the most 
cost-effective manner. All risks are not 
equally serious. Government should fo-
cus on the most serious hazards. Sound 
science and comparative risk analysis 
should be drawn upon during the legisla-
tive drafting process. Regulating trivia 
harms the society by diverting resources 
away from more productive use. 
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5. Congress should promote regulatory jus-
tice. Legislators and regulators should 
avoid imposing costs on innocent parties. 
Where regulation substantially reduces 
property rights, compensation should be 
paid. Retroactively applying laws to 
parties who met previous legal require-
ments should be avoided. 
Conclusion 
Now is an especially propitious time for 
Congress to embark upon significant reform of 
government regulation in the United States. 
Such action would respond to the widespread 
citizen dissatisfaction with the high cost and 
limited benefits of many governmental activi-
ties. 
Government decisionmakers overlook an 
important fact when adopting new or expanded 
regulatory requirements: government inter-
vention often does more harm than good. Poli-
cymakers should not ignore the tremendous 
ability of individuals and private organizations 
to deal with the shortcomings that inevitably 
arise in a modern economy. 
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